WASHINGTON—Four countries last year prevented Syria from receiving equipment that could be used to test ballistic missile components, a senior U.S. official said on Wednesday.
U.S. national security adviser Stephen Hadley described the previously undisclosed incident in a speech to members of the Proliferation Security Initiative, a network of countries that seeks to stop illicit weapons of mass destruction shipments.
The Bush administration has portrayed the PSI effort, which was launched five years ago and has more than 90 nations as members, as a significant success in its drive to prevent biological, chemical or nuclear terrorism.
Analysts say it is hard to judge its effectiveness because members are reluctant to disclose successes to avoid betraying sources that provide intelligence needed to stop shipments.
"One example of its success occurred in February 2007, when four nations represented in this room worked together to interdict equipment bound for Syria -- equipment that could have been used to test ballistic missile components," Hadley said at a conference to mark PSI's fifth anniversary.
"Interdictions like this one have been successful all over the world—and have stopped many shipments of sensitive materials destined for Iran, North Korea, and Syria," he said, providing no further details.
The United States in April released photographs of what it said was a Syrian nuclear reactor built with North Korean help. Israel destroyed the reactor in a September 6 air strike that was initially shrouded in secrecy out of what U.S. officials said was fear that its disclosure could prompt Syrian retaliation.
Syria has denied the facility was a nuclear reactor.
U.S. Acting Undersecretary of State John Rood on Tuesday said there had been dozens of PSI interdictions, including preventing the export of dual-use missile-related technologies as well as nuclear-related items to Iran. He gave no details.
Dual-use technologies are those with both civilian and military applications.
Measuring Success
Hadley argued that the countries in PSI—some of whom do not want their involvement publicized—need to explain their efforts and to prevent their citizens from becoming complacent about the threat of weapons of mass destruction.
"This is no time to fall under the spell of an apparent calm or the illusion of false security," he said.
In an effort to deter countries, militant groups or individuals from promoting chemical, biological or nuclear attacks, Hadley repeated the long-standing U.S. position that it reserved the right to use "overwhelming force" in response.
Echoing a speech he made in February, he also said the United States would hold "fully accountable" those who support "terrorist groups" to acquire WMD "by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts."
Robert Einhorn, a former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation who is now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank, praised PSI but stressed that countries had made such efforts for years.
"PSI was a good idea and it provides value added to what was done before," he said, saying holding exercises had created habits of cooperation and smoothed the way for joint action.
"How do we measure success here, especially where the partners are understandably reluctant to share information about successes or failures?" he said. "It's very hard."
Feeds