WASHINGTON, D.C.—Based on the current political situation in Afghanistan, observers believe that if necessary steps are not taken to accelerate the process of rebuilding the Afghan economy and society, Afghanistan will fall into a deeper state of instability and chaos.
The recent Peace Jirga (Council) held in Kabul between Pakistani and Afghan tribal leaders and other government officials brought about some level of hope to tackle the rise of terrorist activities.
The main focus of the Peace Jirga was to address the rising activities of the insurgents and some elements of al-Qaeda at the borders of both countries and to find solutions to fight them. However, it is hard to ignore the question: how can Afghanistan succeed fighting terrorism on the face of deteriorating security, poorly equipped and an underpaid police force, suicide bombing, illegal drug crisis as well as the sluggish pace of reconstruction?
These are some of the major obstacles and challenges faced by President Hamid Karzai's government, U.S. troops, the international community, NATO forces, and the people of Afghanistan.
These challenges on the ground indicate that the ongoing policies of war on terror are not sufficient. Thus the question arises: what more must the international community, especially the key actor, the United States do to prevent the failing security situation in Afghanistan before it is too late?
What steps can be taken to prevent the increasing instability in Afghanistan?
Clearly there is very little hope in solving the problems through diplomatic solutions with the Taliban and insurgents according to Mr. Bruce Riedel, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, a political think-tank based in Washington, D.C. However, if the United States send the necessary forces along the NATO forces, it is not too late to win the war, "but time is running out," he said in our interview on August 23.
SK: Do we need a new strategy to secure stability in Afghanistan and in the region, which includes negotiating openly with the Taliban?
BR: In my view what we need in Afghanistan is a commitment of resources equal to the job at hand. The United States has under researched the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan from the beginning.
Too few troops and too few resources have been the Achilles heel of the Bush administration's approach for almost six years. The strategy of relying on small numbers of troops in Provincial Reconstruction Teams around the country has been like trying to put a bandaid on a chest wound. We simply have not sent the size force needed to do the job.
Worse, we have tried to rebuild a country devastated by a quarter century of wars, invasion and terror on the cheap. Instead of a massive economic reconstruction effort akin to the Marshall Plan of the 1940s, Afghans have gotten less economic aid on a per capita basis than Haitians or Bosnians. The result has been the revival of the opium trade and the drug culture which corrupts Afghan government and society.
We have seen promises to increase aid to Afghanistan belatedly this year from President Bush, but most of the money is for military and security needs, not economic reconstruction and development. The Afghan army badly needs modern weapons and vehicles but the Afghan economy needs even more. The US, the European Union, Japan, India, Russia and the Arab Gulf States should work to develop a multi billion dollar multi year economic aid plan under the leadership of the U.N.
President Karzai's government has been trying to talk to the so-called moderates in the Taliban for several years with little results to show. The German BND intelligence service has apparently also tried but the Taliban would not break its ties to al al-Qaeda.
I am very skeptical that there is a substantial body of 'moderate' Taliban. The movement remains under the leadership of Mullah Omar, the self proclaimed Commander of the Faithful, and an extreme enemy of Karzai, the West and America. Mullah Omar is not interested in talking, his calculation is that time is on the side of the Taliban. He believes America and its NATO allies will lose the will to fight in Afghanistan just as the Soviet Union lost the will to fight and went home. Mullah Omar is not going to break with al al-Qaeda and Usama bin Laden. Mullah Omar is not going to abandon his drive to put back together the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan that harbored al-Qaeda and repressed its own peoples.
SK: What is Pakistan's role?
BR: Pakistan has been the incubator for the Taliban's revival in the last few years just as it was the incubator for its creation in the 1990s. While the Pakistan government temporarily withdrew its support in 2001, it has since looked the other way as the Taliban has used Pakistani territory to recruit, train and fund its revival. Mullah Omar, for example, has spent considerable time in Pakistan since 2002 in hiding.
Taliban fighters with al-Qaeda assistance rely on safe haven in Pakistan to escape NATO offensives in the south and east. Pakistani sponsored Kashmiri groups also provide support and help to the Taliban and al-Qaeda based on connections that go back to the late 1990s and joint terrorist operations like the hijacking of an Indian air liner in 1999. Efforts to develop joint Pakistani-Afghan intelligence sharing against the Taliban and al-Qaeda under U.S. sponsorship have yet to bear significant fruit.
SK: Can diplomacy work with the Taliban?
BR: Before September 11th I was a member of the US diplomatic team that dealt with the Taliban in my position as Special Assistant to President Clinton for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the White House. We appealed to Mullah Omar and his colleagues repeatedly to hand over bin Laden to justice between 1997 and 2001. I traveled to Kabul to meet directly with the Taliban leadership, including its so called moderate members, in 1998. We urged Pakistan to pressure the Taliban to give up bin Laden. We went to the United Nations Security Council and got several unanimous UN resolutions passed pressing the Taliban to cease supporting terrorism and al-Qaeda. Despite intense diplomacy both in bilateral and multilateral venues, the Taliban rejected every overture.
I don't see today any reason to believe the outcome would be any different now if NATO or some NATO countries engaged in talks with Taliban representatives. Rather it would undermine the legitimacy of the Karzai government, encourage further Pakistani tolerance of the Taliban on its soil and weaken the unity of the Alliance. And with no prospect of success as long as Mullah Omar calls the shots in the Taliban.
SK: Where will Afghanistan be in five years if we stick with the current approach?
BR: Today thousands of brave soldiers from across the NATO alliance are trying to help the Afghan people. In Kandahar Canadian troops from the famous 22nd Regiment (the van doos) are on the very front line of the war against terrorism and al-Qaeda in its back yard and home town. British Army troops are fighting next door in Helmand Province and Dutch forces in Oruzgan Province, Mullah Omar's birthplace. American troops are fighting in the east. They all deserve our full support and the support of a President focused on the central battlefield in the war against al-Qaeda, Afghanistan.
If we continue to under resource this battle and try to win on the cheap, we will find ourselves with an Afghanistan that retreats into instability and chaos. We know from history what that will produce. We should not make the same mistakes again.
If we send the necessary military force along with our NATO allies and make a major commitment to rebuilding the Afghan economy and society we can still win this war. It is not too late but time is running out.
Mr. Bruce Riedel is a Senior Fellow at Saban Center, Brookings Institution, a political think-tank based in Washington, D.C. He is an analyst of Middle East and South Asia history and politics with extensive experience in regional diplomacy, conflict management, counter terrorism and energy security. He retired in 2006 after 30 years service at the Central Intelligence Agency including postings overseas in the Middle East and Europe. He was a senior advisor on the region to the last three Presidents of the United States in the staff of the National Security Council at the White House. He was also Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Near East and South Asia at the Pentagon and a senior advisor at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels.
Shakila Khalje is an Afghani-American journalist based in Washington, D.C.
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