Estimates vary from 600,000 to 3¼ million deaths caused by starvation in North Korea during the mid-1990s. "As many as one million" is the phrase used by Stephan Haggard and Marcus Nolan in their recently published book, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform.
Due to the insularity and isolation of the North Korean regime, it's difficult to obtain the whole story of the famine. This book, Famine in North Korea, is the most authoritative account to date available. A related report, Failure to Protect relies heavily on it in building a case for the UN to act because of the North Korean regime's failure to protect its people from starvation and chronic hunger.
In 1998, seven year old North Korean boys were 20% shorter (8 inches) and 40% lighter (19 lbs) than their South Korean counterparts. The effects of the famine were not limited to the period 1995-98. Accounts by aid workers and foreign residents of Pyongyang in 1998 said children that were 7 years old looked like 3 to 4 years old; the United Nation's World Food Program (WFP) survey found that 30% of toddlers suffered from moderate to severe malnutrition, according to Failure to Protect.
North Korea continues to inhibit food aid distribution and denies access to humanitarian organizations in 42 of the 203 North Korean counties. North Korean officials admitted recently that they are short one million tons, which represents about 20% of North Korea's food needs, according the WFP, cited by Reuters (March 26, 2007).
Evidence of 2½ Million Died of Starvation
There is credible evidence that the number who died of starvation in North Korea from 1995 to 1998 was considerably more than the million that Nolan and Haggard use. The highest-ranking defector from North Korea, Hwang Jong Yup, put the figure at two and half million, according to Failure to Protect. Hwang had access to internal North Korean agricultural officials' estimates, and this figure is consistent with other independent studies.
Whatever the correct number is, it was avoidable. The cause was almost entirely man-made, according to Haggard and Nolan and others who are experts on the North Korean regime. This tragedy was largely the result of the Communist regime's indifference to human suffering, its economic collapse, its insular nature and self-imposed isolation, its blocking of humanitarian aid, and its inequitable food distribution system.
The two authors spoke at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, D.C. Marcus Nolan is an economist and senior fellow at the Peterson Institute, and Stephan Haggard is a professor of international relations at the University of California (San Diego).
The Root Causes of the Famine
The North Korean regime blames the famine in the 1990s on the flooding that occurred in 1995 and 1996. However, these natural disasters were not the true causes. The famine was preceded by several years of food shortages. Data suggests that death rates began to climb in 1993 and 1994. The famine was well underway by 1995.
"The rigidly authoritarian regime made little effort to offset declining harvests either by purchasing grain in the world market or appealing to humanitarian assistance…," says Noland and Haggard. When the humanitarian aid finally came in, North Korea chose to cut its commercial imports of food rather than take it as a supplement to the food supply, said Noland.
North Korea faces great challenges to entirely grow its own food supply. Mountainous and cold, only about 20% of the land is arable.
"…the long run solution to the food problem is to export minerals and manufacturers, and import bulk grains—just like its neighbors China, South Korea, and Japan do," say Haggard and Noland.
But five decades of Communist policies in North Korea refused to accept the fact that North Korea cannot on its own produce sufficient food to feed its 23 million people. It certainly didn't help agricultural production that farming was organized into collectives and state farms. Private production and markets were not allowed.
The North Korean policy of food self-sufficiency originated from the guiding ideology of North Korean founder Kim Il Sung, called juche, or "spirit of self-reliance," which led to North Korea closing itself off from outside influences. Imposing the self-sufficiency ideology on the agricultural sector was a disaster. Driven by juche enforced policies—for example, intensive re-cropping and over reliance on fertilizers—the outcome would be depleted soil, and consequently, less fertile land and declining agricultural output.
Government Control of the Food
Another factor that made the population vulnerable to the hunger was the regime's strict control of the food distribution system. The North Korean regime had created a distribution system in which 62% of the population depended upon government rations for basic subsistence, says Failure to Protect. Persons who were military or belong to the Communist Party or to a favored occupation, or were perceived as more loyal to the regime, received a larger allotment than those perceived as less loyal or useful to the regime. Thus, a privileged worker received 900 grams per day, while an urban resident received 300 grams. Noland held up a jar with 300 grams of grain in it, and asserted that it obviously wasn't enough to survive on.
North Korea had relied on the Soviet Union for aid until its collapse in 1989, and China until 1993. Then China had its own troubles and sharply cutoff food exports and fuel aid to North Korea, which was receiving from China 68% of its food imports and 77% of its fuel imports. By 1994, the food distribution system largely collapsed.
By 1997, rations were cut to a paltry 128 grams a day, and the system may have been feeding less than 10% of the population, according to Failure to Protect. The northeastern provinces were hit hardest, where food shipments were prohibited.
The regime failed to respond to the crisis, and alert the international world that its people were starving to death. The regime's response was often cruel, such as recommending "alternative foods," e.g., bricks composed of bark, leaves, and grass. The latter might fill the stomach but it had no nutritional value and caused dysentery, diarrhea, and internal bleeding.
The regime inhibited and tried to prevent the starving populations from searching for food on their own or moving to other areas less impacted by the famine.
When the international aid finally arrived, the regime hindered effective monitoring commonly used to ensure that aid is delivered to those in most need. The regime limited the number of WFP and NGO into the country, making it difficult to access where and what help was needed. The regime prohibited the use of Korean speakers who could have gathered information independently. Instead, the aid workers had to use regime interpreters.
The foreign aid organizations were compelled to use the North Korean food distribution system, a network controlled by party officials, and subject to diversion, theft and corruption.
About 95% of the North Korean refugees in China said they were unaware of the world humanitarian aid, said Nolan, and those who knew believed that the military and/or the Party were the recipients of the food. However, the diversion of the aid at least brought food into the economy and a market system evolved as people used coping strategies to survive. The regime tolerates this market system, but tries to control it.
Today, a cloud hangs over North Korea's future, which is reflected in a certain pessimism that pervades the book. The regime's economic backwardness and the immense suspicion and mistrust that it holds towards foreign aid and foreign investments does not bode well for the future in finding a sustainable solution to its chronic food shortages.
Feeds