It may not be a coincidence that as the Bush administration becomes more frustrated with the chaos in Iraq that it is looking to Iran to take some of the blame.
The cold relationship and suspicion that the U.S. harbors towards Iran and vice versa go back to Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution and the 52 Americans hostages that were held for 444 days. Diplomatic relations were broken off and the suspicion and distrust held for the other has not changed in 28 years.
A Senior Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations thinks there is another way. He is Ray Takeyh, an expert on the Middle East and the author of Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic. He says that now is a propitious time to begin establishing normal relations between the U.S. and Iran. In a paper to be published in the March/April issue of Foreign Affairs, entitled "Time for Détente with Iran," Takeyh argues that Washington would be wise to rethink its strategy.
Takeyh says that a new faction is emerging in the leadership of Iran that is not as hot-headed as the "radicals" that now control the regime. They stress "Iranian nationalism" over Islamic identity." These are young pragmatists, who want to assert Iran's power in the region while not unnecessarily antagonize the U.S.
As the pragmatists vie for influence against the more ideological, "radical" hardliners, the U.S. can help tilt the balance of power in Tehran towards the pragmatists and by so doing, build a more stable relationship with Iran.
When Saddam fell to the Americans, and the Taliban were ousted in Afghanistan, it left Iran as the most powerful nation in the Persian Gulf. Iran could assume a dominating role in the region, unhindered by the U.S., if the leadership in Iran were to end its confrontation with the U.S. and, instead, pursue a policy of coexistence.
With this faction willing to consider accommodation with the U.S., it behooves Washington to "reciprocate by devising a comprehensive strategy of détente...," offers Takeyh.
How is this view of Iran even thinkable? Isn't the president a Holocaust denier? Isn't Iran supporting terrorists groups, such as Hezbollah? Doesn't Iran seek the overthrow of its neighbors? Hasn't Iran been responsible for the killing of Americans in Iraq and the arming of the Shiite militias? What about Iran's intentions to build a nuclear bomb?
Takeyh's response is that Iran's impulse to export its Islamic revolution died long ago. "…most of Iran's "revolutionary dreams perished on the battlefields of Iraq [during the war] in the 1980s. The costly war with Baghdad forced the clerical elite to realize the limits of its power and the impracticality of its ambitions."
Iran's leaders in recent times—even including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—have not denounced or sought to overthrow the monarchies of the Persian Gulf and pro-Western regimes in Egypt and Jordan, and have restrained themselves in Iraq.
The Iraq government is Shiite dominated and so is naturally sympathetic towards the Shiite Iran. But Takeyh says that Iran is only seeking to prevent a hostile Sunni-dominated regime, not to install a puppet regime.
Takeyh acknowledged that Iran's Islamic Republic in the past carried out some disruptive tactics in the international arena. Tehran was assassinating Iranian dissidents in Europe and supporting terrorist activities in the Persian Gulf, but abandoned these practices when other states imposed trade restrictions.
Similarly, when Iran agreed to stop its support of radical groups in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, the latter states normalized relations with Iran. This is proof, says Takeyh, that "the strategic advantages of détente convinced Tehran to change its ways."
Takeyh is claiming here that Iran is not actively fanning the flames in Iraq as the Bush administration has been advocating lately. This position is supported by the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released Feb. 2, which stated that the sectarian violence has a dynamic of its own and is not likely to be appreciably influenced by outsiders.
The NIE, which represents the consensus of the U.S. intelligence community, does acknowledge, however, that Iranian military support for certain Iraqi Shia groups intensifies the conflict. However, that support is in itself not decisive.
As for Admadinejad being a Holocaust denier, Takeyh says he probably is, but this should be seen as merely a public relations ploy, which incidentally has worked remarkably well. Even in Sunni-dominated Egypt, Admadinejad is the third most popular man in the Arab world. Takeyh views Ahmadinejad as a crafty operator trying to arouse public indignation and exploit the intense anti-American feeling throughout the Middle East.
"…there is a growing hunger for a leader willing to stand up to Israel and the United States. And he very much wants to be that leader," says Takeyh.
Admadinejad's provocative speeches can, unfortunately, act as a distraction to an important development within Iran's new right. Takeyh describes a cohesive group that stresses "Iranian nationalism over Islamic identity" and "pragmatism over ideology."
Takeyh mentioned Ali Larijani, head of the Supreme National Security Council, as an example of a new kind of leader. These individuals believe that Iran should be a regional power and would make more progress towards that end if the leadership had a less ideological and anti-West mentality.
"In the last two years, many members of this pragmatic faction have risen to influence in the Supreme National Security Council, the intelligence community, and the military," says Takeyh. Working with the clerical side and the supreme leader Khamenei, they are trying to take control of Iran's international relations away from the militants.
Takeyh believes that current U.S. policy is based on a faulty perception of Iran as a destabilizing force, which "congealed in the U.S. imagination" long ago and continues to this day. The U.S. policy towards Iran of containment and placing conditions on any talks ceased being appropriate when Iran "stopped being a revolutionary state bent on forcibly exporting its model of government."
Moreover, unlike the Cold War days, our allies (with the exception of Israel) do not see Iran as a major or urgent threat as they did the Soviet Union, says Takeyh.
If the U.S. were to move away from a policy of "regime change" towards normalization of relations and legitimizing its power, the pragmatists in Tehran would be strengthened. They in turn would be able to sway the "indecisive" Supreme Leader, Khamenei, who could marginalize the "radicals," whose modus operandi is confrontation with the U.S.
Then, as Tehran has a stake in economic and security agreements, he predicts it would play a constructive role in getting Hezbollah not to attack Israel and bringing about a stable Iraq.
One weakness in Takeyh's analysis is that it leaves out any role for the democratic opposition in Iran, which he says is "nonexistent."
But Akbar Ganji, the Iranian journalist who was jailed for six years for exposing serial murders by high public officials, said in July 18, 2006 in Washington, D.C. that the democracy movement in Iran is widespread (see Ex-Prisoner Journalist Tells of Iran's Greatest Weakness ), and fostering conditions of peace between the U.S. and Iran would most help it flourish.
Ganji was concerned about the stepped up censorship and the imprisonment and torture of political reformers since Admadinedaj came to power.
There are many examples of a harsh state apparatus in Iran bent on diminishing the freedoms of its citizens. The conservative pragmatists, whom Takeyh places such high hopes, are members of a ruling elite, and have no interest in reversing the totalitarian tendencies of the regime. If they show so little compassion for their own people and disregard fundamental principles of human rights, how can the U.S. depend on them?
In bolstering his case for changing our approach to Iran, Takeyh often mentions China as a successful case of the U.S. reversing its diplomacy, begun when President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger visited the People's Republic of China in 1972. However, the U.S. support and trade with China has not made the latter any more democratic or diminished its persecution of democracy advocates, Christians, Buddhists and Falun Gong practitioners.
As the Communist regime enjoys all the economic advantages of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status that was bestowed upon it, China secured the survival of its ruling Communist Party; it modernizes its military for offensive purposes, and denies a free press and other freedoms that the pundits said would be forthcoming from normal trade relations between the U.S. and this totalitarian state. The "Peaceful Rise" that China espouses is evidently a lie that can no longer be believed.
The 2003 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Iranian human rights lawyer, Shirin Ebadi, jailed in Iran for her dissident activities, said in a 1999 interview: "Any person who pursues human rights in Iran must live with fear from birth to death, but I have learned to overcome my fear" (McGill Reporter, Oct 28, 2004).
Statements like the above makes one wonder whether Takeyh's recommendations would make any fundamental difference in the lives of the Iranian people and in the long term relationship with the U.S.
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