LOS ANGELES - Pepperdine University's School of Public Policy hosted a forum March 8th on The Worth of US-Taiwan Relations at their Malibu campus.
Some important issues regarding US-Taiwan relations were addressed at the forum including the validity of current U.S. policy regarding Taiwan and cross-strait relations between the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (Taiwan).
The flowering of democracy on the island of Taiwan under the shadow of the Chinese communist regime across the Taiwan strait is one of the great success stories in international geopolitics. But a complete success in terms of full independence has yet to be realized by the Taiwanese people.
The Chinese communist regime continues to make strong claims to sovereignty over Taiwan, using military intimidation and its anti-secession law enacted last year. As the economic and military influence of the PRC grows it calls into question the commitment of the United States to Taiwan.
In Part IV panel presentations were made by Professors Rosen and Kaufman.
We now continue with the second half of the forum that focused on US-Taiwan relations from the perspective of the Taiwanese people. Michael Warder, Vice Chancellor, Pepperdine University, was the moderator of the forum panel. A question and answer session at the end of this article concluded the forum.
PROFESSOR BRUCE HERSCHENSOHN, PEPPERDINE
Bruce Herschensohn is Adjunct Professor of Public Policy at the Pepperdine School of Public Policy. He is the editor of Democracy: The Bridge between Mainland China and Taiwan and Hong Kong at the Handover. He was former Assistant to President Nixon. Below are some of Professor Herschensohn's comments.
The Kuomintang (KMT) was a Real Dictatorship
For those who may not be familiar with the acronyms of DPP and KMT; the DPP is the Democratic Progressive Party of President Chen and KMT refers to the Kuomintang Party.
It was mentioned that the KMT was not so dictatorial. Please keep in mind that the current DPP vice president, Annette Lu, was imprisoned for 12 years by the KMT because she participated in a human rights rally. It was a real dictatorship. Practically nothing on earth has been as bad as Mao Tse-tung, I will give you that--what with the great march forward, 25 million people killed, and the Cultural Revolution. The greatest thing I think could be said about Chiang Kai-Shek is that he was not Mao Tse-tung. But believe me it was a dictatorship.
The KMT Party Acts as a Proxy for the People's Republic of China
When I said that the Kuomintang was acting as a proxy for the People's Republic of China, I said it for several reasons. For example, put a list of those things the People's Republic of China wants or opposes and put a list of what the KMT wants or opposes and you will find that they match up almost perfectly.
First, the KMT is against independence of Taiwan. It is for unification or reunification as they often say. But reunification is an inaccurate term. The flag of the People's Republic of China has not flown for one minute over Taiwan. You don't reunify with a government of which you have never been unified.
Even the anti-secession bill was a strange name. They are not going to secede from a country they are not part of. After the anti-secession law went through, there were over a million people in Taipei that rallied against the anti-secession law, but not one participant from the KMT--none, zero.
However, the following Wednesday (after the Saturday rally), they [KMT] were on the streets of Beijing. And eventually, the chairman of the KMT went to Beijing and talked against independence. And James Soon of the People's First party did the same thing.
Democracy is the Enemy of the KMT
I believe that the democracy is the enemy of the KMT. Remember that they came in when there was no democracy. When the democracy was started and evolved they lost the presidency. They have not had the presidency since it was given up and there were free elections. I am more for Taiwan than the Taiwanese who are KMT. They truly are proxies, right now, whether they would say it or not, for the policies of the People's Republic of China. Lien Chan, during his tenure as chairman of the KMT, went to Beijing, China and spoke against independence.
If Chairman Ma becomes President it may result in "One country, Two systems", like the Hong Kong Model
Now there is a new chairman, Chairman Ma, who I believe is much more dangerous, and may well become the president of Taiwan. He is a charismatic and young guy and certainly knows how to address a crowd. But I think he is terribly dangerous. I think if he does become president, this is my belief, that he will have one country, two systems, a la the Hong Kong system in Taiwan.
If you ever make policy from fear… you are going to lose
I recognize the average person in Taiwan will say let's go for the status quo. Believe me I understand it. And why are they for the status quo? Because they are scared; because they don't want a war. I understand that. But nevertheless, if you ever make policy from fear, whether you are just a human being, a regular person, or a nation, you are going to lose. You don't make policy out of being afraid. But I certainly understand the average person in Taiwan saying 'just leave things alone; I don't want those missiles coming over here--I don't want a war with China.' I don't agree with it, but I understand it.
A Two-State Policy should be the correct policy for Taiwan and China
We have a one-state, a "One China" policy. Why do we have a two-state policy in the Mideast between Israel and the Palestinian Authority? The Palestinian Authority deserves a state but Taiwan doesn't? The Palestinian Authority wants to take over Israel. Taiwan does not want to take over China. The Palestinian Authority despises the United States. Taiwan supports the United States.
Why is a one-state solution preferable in one area of the world in East Asia but a two-state solution is preferable in the Mideast? These are all old policies of the state department that go from president to president. Most of them, not all of them, come in to office not knowing one darn thing about China and Taiwan. They learn it from the experts who are careerists who want to educate presidents. They have no interests in fulfilling the policies of the president. They have interests in fulfilling the policies of the bureaucracy. And they educate the president according to the interests of the bureaucracy.
PROFESSOR RICHARD BAUM, UCLA
Richard Baum is Professor of Political Science at UCLA and Director of the UCLA Center for Chinese Studies. He is the author or editor of 8 books on Chinese politics and has held a variety of visiting professorships in different Asian countries. Below are some of Professor Baum's comments.
Baum: I want to step back a bit and talk about the impact of globalization, the forces that have been unleashed and how those forces have impacted Taiwan. There has been a paradoxical result of the processes of globalization. On the one hand Taiwan has become more economically interdependent with mainland China, to a degree that some on Taiwan find alarming. And some on mainland China find an opportunity to manipulate.
There was a piece in the Chinese press just the other day claiming that if China were to use all of its economic leverage against Taiwan, it could bring Taiwan's economy to a halt in a week, just because of the trade and the investment flow that is involved. I think that is an exaggeration. But it certainly does suggest that there are strong ties pulling those two economies and with them the societies together. It is no accident that the son of Jiang Zemin for example is a partner with the son of one of Taiwan's leading industrialists in a semi-conductor joint venture in Shanghai. That's no accident, it is happening more and more frequently. So here we have the forces of economics moving this way.
Economic Integration versus Political Independence and Separation
On the other hand, another aspect of globalization, is self-determination and democracy, the spread of democracy and freedom. That has been pulling in the opposite direction, pulling the Taiwanese people toward a more separate identity, a national identity if you will; and the data that Stan [Stanley Rosen] provided clearly reflects this. So you have two contradictory things going on at once: economic integration and political separation. Now which trumps which? It's not clear at this point. It depends on your theory of globalization. And there as many theories of globalization as there are theorists to play with them.
What has happened in the last few years though, I think, is that the forces of economic integration and globalization have at least served as a restraint on the contrary forces of political independence and separation. I think that there is a growing body of economic opinion in Taiwan and it is at this point at least represented politically by the Kuomintang that looks for investment in China, as well as trade, and good relations with China.
The Three Links
We have not yet talked about the three links. This has been a policy of direct transportation, direct communication, and direct coastal relations, that has been on the table for 50 years and has never reached fruition. The three links are a policy that would take the process of economic integration and push it farther with certain political overtones.
Thus far it has been the KMT that has been pushing for a quick resolution of the three links problem because they want to firmly chart Taiwan's course on a cooperative path with China. I don't think they are capitulationists, I really don't agree with Bruce on this. I really don't think they are traitors to Taiwanese identity. I think they just have a different sense of what's in Taiwan's best interest in the long term.
Now in this sense you have to go back to Lee Teng-hui. Now, Bruce was it you who said that Lee Teng-hui was a great statesman?
Herschensohn: You bet!
Baum: Okay… it was Lee Teng-hui, who said, and he said it repeatedly in the nineties, and I was there once when he said it. He said, 'If China can develop a thriving market economy and can open its polity and become democratic, then our objections to reunification will evaporate and it will be a possibility.'
Herschensohn: He [Lee Teng-hui] has changed.
Baum: Well, because China is actually doing those things. Now, I am not arguing that China is democratic, certainly not, but the evolutionary forces at work including the same globalization forces that I mentioned: economic integration and interdependence are pushing in that direction. The Chinese are trying to control the internet, they can't. They are trying to suppress public opinion, they can't in the long run. It is a losing struggle. They are pushing the Sisyphean rock uphill and it keeps coming back down on them. Eventually there will be an evolutionary, political opening.
And I think the Kuomintang is taking a realistic posture when it says that we should be on this wave; not under it, being crushed by it. I think Cheng Shui-bian feels himself increasingly marginalized, public opinion shows that his personal popularity dropped to an all time low just last month. And so, his new initiative to abolish the National Unification Council, is understandable as a kind of attempt to regain political initiative. But it is dangerous as Stan [Stanley Rosen] suggested, he is playing with fire by trying to up the ante in the Taiwan Straits.
And the Chinese of course are very worried about that. I spent last fall in Beijing teaching in Peking University and I spoke to my students, colleagues, and government officials and they all said that the tendency in cross-strait relations for the last six months has been good, both sides seem to be taking a strong cognizance of the other's basic interests, and nobody is upsetting the apple cart.
'But we worry about Chen Shui-bian' they said, if he gets cornered and gets desperate and sees that the opposition Kuomintang is the initiative and the momentum is shifting strongly in that direction, we are afraid that he might do something really provocative and destabilizing. And indeed that is not a bad forecast. I think we have seen the beginning of that, whether we have seen the end of it or not, I don't know.
Moderator [Michael Warder, Vice Chancellor]: You mentioned that they were afraid and Bruce mentioned earlier that people on Taiwan were afraid. How would you characterize the two kinds of fear? If you are in Beijing with 1.3 billion people and missiles pointed at Taiwan, etc., you said that they are afraid that Chen Shui-bian would…
Baum: They are afraid, but it is a different fear. They are not afraid of being attacked. What they are afraid of is being pushed into a corner where they cannot but respond with military force. Nationalism is a very important force in China and increasingly so in Taiwan with the identity curves that Stan [Rosen] has shown. In China they are very much afraid that Chen Shui-bian will leave them no alternative but to invoke the language of the anti-secession law that says we will use non-peaceful means.
Moderator: Bruce, did you want to respond?
Herschensohn: Yes. I wouldn't put much credence to anything that is said in a classroom in Beijing.
Baum: It's my classroom. (Audience breaks out in laughter)
Herschensohn: I have had students from the People's Republic of China that have defended the Tiananmen Square massacre, who have defended force-abortions, who have defended everything that the People's Republic of China gives as policy. They are awfully good people and good students. And I believe that there is no way for me to get inside their minds. But I believe that they are afraid not to say those things. The government there is very overbearing. Therefore, in China I certainly would not take their statements as indicative of what policy should be.
I remember, and this may seem off the subject. I was in the Soviet Union walking towards an airplane with a person obviously from the KGB, I am sure she was in security. She was walking me to the airplane and I was whistling something. And she said what is that song? And I said, 'Bess, You Is My Woman Now' by Gershwin. Then she just stopped. Then I said, do you like it? She said 'I do not know' (Audience breaks out in laughter). She didn't know whether I was KGB or CIA.
And I find the same kind of thing happens when I am with Chinese students. Good people, my God, you can't dislike them, these are good people. But they have inborn fear and I understand how they have that fear.
Moderator: Bob [Kaufman].
PROFESSOR ROBERT KAUFMAN, PEPPERDINE
Robert Kaufman is Professor of Public Policy at the Pepperdine University School of Public Policy. He is the author of Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics and earned his Ph.D. in International Relations from Columbia University as well as a J. D. from Georgetown University.
Kaufman: I agree with Richard, I wouldn't call the KMT capitulationists either. I think they are dedicated in the main to a democratic system. And in fact it's the KMT that permitted democracy to take root.
Herschensohn: Lee (In response to Kaufman's last statement above, Bruce called out the name of Lee, for Lee Teng-hui, as the person most responsible in the KMT for democracy to take root).
Kaufman: Where I agree with Bruce, and largely do agree with Bruce, is that Richard [Kaufman] is much too optimistic that the forces of globalizations will inevitably lead in one direction. I don't see it that way. I think it is much more contingent than you seem to suggest. I think ultimately the Chinese leadership, which is still brutally dictatorial, is going to face a choice of abandoning its monopoly on power or trying to expand their way out of it.
I think that maintaining an independent, democratic Taiwan and a democratic alliance system is the best way to maximize the possibility of China evolving in a benign direction consistent with American interests and Taiwanese interests. And that will require the United States categorically saying just as we said to Hamas, we do not negotiate on this issue until there is a government that will respect the freedom of Israel to exist in secure boundaries. We can't negotiate with a China unless we are negotiating with a China which is ultimately committed in some configuration to maintaining the democratic freedom that the Taiwanese now enjoy.
So in that sense, for somewhat different reasons, I think the policy implications of my analysis are much closer to Bruce's than to yours [Baum].
Moderator: Stan [Stanley Rosen].
PROFESSOR STANLEY ROSEN, USC
Stanley Rosen is the Director of the East Asian Studies Center and Professor of Political Science at USC; author or editor of a variety of books on China, including State and Society in 21st-Century China (co-edited, 2004), Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (1982); Editor of the journal, Chinese Education and Society; He received his Ph. D. from UCLA.
Rosen: First, Bruce is absolutely right about the KMT being a very harsh dictatorship. When you look at those identity surveys I handed out, a lot of people interpret that identity due to negative reaction toward the KMT, perhaps more than anything else.
If you look at the documentary, Tug of War , which is made from the viewpoint of the Taiwanese, based on who funded it. People in that documentary talk about how, if our daughter were to marry a mainlander we would rather feed her to the pigs. There are some very strong feelings in there.
I didn't show these posters earlier, but if you go back to 1991, this really documents what Bruce was talking about. This is a poster from 1991 when you had the first open elections for the National Assembly and it is basically saying that the KMT are proxies for mainland leaders; it has Deng Xiaoping there and other leaders of the time there, including the Taiwanese Premier, and it is basically saying which side are you on?
It [poster] has the policies of the KMT, the Chinese Communist Party, and the DPP and it is basically making the argument that the KMT is no different, a vote for the KMT is a vote for the Communist Party of mainland China. Some of the independent candidates went even further like Su Qiuzhen, whose campaign office I visited. It was bombed in the bathroom the night before I got there, and he showed me the damage that had been done. This was the National Assembly election of 1991. And they were very critical of Lee Teng-hui at that time who was KMT, in fact he was the first elected KMT president in 1996 in an open, free election.
While referring to campaign materials, Rosen spoke a few words in Mandarin--here is a very insulting term, it is very strong, 'Premier, I am warning you Lee Teng-hui, [additional Mandarin words spoken by Rosen], this was not a nice term for him, 'the premier is a bastard', I hate to use bad language. It was very strong. And this is representative of the campaign going on.
Moderator: Those are official campaign documents?
Rosen: Well, I don't make these myself (audience breaks out in laughter).
Moderator: There is an American tradition of campaigns saying I don't know how that literature was created.
Rosen: Well that's an independent candidate and actually he didn't win. He was actually put in jail three times under the KMT.
I have a comment on Bruce's "one country, two systems" point of discussion. I met Ma Ying-jeou for the first time in 1991 during a trip to Taiwan as an election observer. More recently, in December 2002, I went as an election observer for mayoral elections in Kaohsiung and Tapei, and attended a press conference for Ma Ying-jeou. He was asked repeatedly by reporters from all over the world, particularly from Hong Kong and Taiwan, "Don't you really believe in one country, two systems"? He had to explain over and over again that no, he does not support the Hong Kong model of "one country, two systems" for Taiwan, but people assume that's his position.
It is a very common brush he is tarred with. True or not, we do not know. But it is a very common and strong perception of him.
I also have a comment on Rick and the three links. This here is a survey of Mainland attitudes on the Taiwan question done in September, 2003 of 4,000 people conducted by a leading private public opinion agency in Beijing. The head of the agency originally went to the propaganda department, now called the publicity department, of the Chinese communist party and asked to do a survey on Taiwan.
They said, absolutely; no problem, the only thing you have to do is to guarantee that 100% of the people support unification.
Well that changed years later and he was finally able to do this survey. About 38 ½ % of the mainland respondents hope the two sides will work hard for economic cooperation and development and strive hard to achieve the three links, i.e., direct transportation (trade), direct communication (mail delivery), and direct coastal relations across the Taiwan Straits. Less than 15% supported the use of military force on behalf of reunification and 13% favored maintenance of the current situation but felt military force might have to be used, perhaps in the long run. About 2.3% said they don't care about independence for Taiwan, and so on and so forth.
But clearly the largest number of people want the continuation of the status quo.
That's why I said earlier, Ma Ying-jeou is playing on the fears, hopes, and however you want to put it for the mainland, Taiwan, and the United States--which is why Chen Shui-bian has a real difficult road.
The last thing I have to comment on is what Rick said about businessmen in Taiwan. Again, this ad from the Liberty Times; one of the main appeals here is for Taiwan businessmen, because Chen Shui-bian had done very, very badly with the business community in Taiwan.
And Ma Ying-jeou's recent trip to Europe and the European Union, this is something that is very popular in Taiwan. This is something that is good for Taiwan business. And he gets a lot of points for doing this. And although it is hard for him to have official relations when he goes to places like Europe for example; they are much more willing to see him and to negotiate with him because they know that the mainland would not be that upset as they would be if Chen Shui-bian did the same.
Herschensohn: The Soviet Union died from economic failure. Why is it that China should give up its dictatorial power because of economic success? I have never seen a nation that prospered because it was having economic success under a dictatorial system. It just doesn't happen that way. None of us here would have predicted that the Soviet Union would have died when it did. We were all set to live our lives with the Soviet Union existing, but it did die in economic failure.
Economic Success in communist China – No Reason to Stop Human Rights Violations and Antagonism toward Taiwan
We seem to think that economic success will bring about the end of the dictatorship in the People's Republic of China and I don't believe that it will. And also why they are prospering they have no reason to stop their human rights violations. They have no reason to stop the tremendous antagonism toward Taiwan. They are being rewarded for their authoritarian system that they have, and even totalitarian at times.
I think that most business people who do business with China, will always say, no we think that it will bring an end to human rights violations, they are coming closer to us and all of that. Baloney! The human rights situation right now is worse in China. And I am going by a source that I usually don't use, the State Department; it's worse now than it ever was, just read their latest human rights report on China.
I think that the greed of people who want a fatter wallet are always able to find a moral justification, they just do, and that's human nature; you know you are doing something for your own good, for your own economic well being. And you give it a virtuous kind of glow to it. I don't believe it has a virtuous glow.
Book: You Can't do Business with Hitler
I want to read just one sentence, if I may, from a book that was written prior to our involvement in World War II. The title of it was, "You Can't Do Business with Hitler", and it was by a guy named Dennis Miller. I am going to read one sentence from it, a sentence that I believe is accurate: 'We must get this straight once and for all, there is no such thing as having purely economic relations with totalitarian states. Every business deal carries with it political, military, social, propaganda implications.'
That book you can't do business with Hitler was not a best seller. Business people did not like it. And I assure you that if any of us in this room were to write a book, You can't do Business with Hu Jintao, it would not be a best seller.
Moderator: I would like Rick (Richard Baum) to respond and then open it up to questions.
Richard Baum: I would say that, first of all, although China gives the appearance of being a macro economic success story, and indeed it is, the aggregate numbers are very impressive--10 percent economic growth and you are all familiar with that, so I do not have to recite it.
China Today: Polarization of Income, Corruption, Local Governments Out of Control
But when you look under the surface at the stresses, the social and even political stresses that are building in Chinese society, you see a very powerful incentive to reform, i.e., unemployment due to the restructuring of the state of the economy, wealth polarization between East and West and between rural and urban is creating great stresses in Chinese society. The polarization of income is pulling apart the society in some ways. Corruption is rampant. Local governments are out of control. They are making sweetheart deals with real estate developers to screw the peasants out of their land.
This is happening on a widespread basis, and is threatening the regime. And they feel threatened by it. They have said over and over again, if we don't improve the quality of our governance, we may not be around to govern very much longer. I think that is a serious threat, and I think they take it seriously.
The problem is the current generation of communist party leadership who are now in their sixties are still tied to the traditional system, the traditional Leninist institutions. That bond is very difficult to break.
Younger generations, and I have spent a lot of months, talking and interacting with them--they know the system is broken. They know it is not working to enable the Leninist dictatorship to be adaptive, responsive, accountable and transparent; those are things that are lacking. They know that and they are perfectly free and willing to say that to us, to me in private. They don't say it in public yet because the leadership does not approve.
I think with the passage in time when the current generation retires towards the end of this decade, the next generation, many of whom are western educated and have much more cosmopolitan values and experiences are much more likely to confront the really hard choice of when do we abrogate this constitutional monopoly on power. I think they will confront the question, how they will answer it, I don't know.
The current regime, I absolutely agree, is not willing to confront that fundamental question. But it must be confronted or Bruce is correct, they will face necessity to keep it in place by force, which is not going to be a pretty picture, and they don't want to do that.
Moderator: Unless there is something else, let's open the forum to questions.
Q: If we supply Taiwan with weapons will that help to defuse the situation in the short term?
A: Herschensohn: Actually the U.S. has attempted to do that; a package has been rejected by the Kuomintang 41 times. Originally it was 15 billion dollars, then 11 billion, I think now it is 9 billion, because the DPP keep on lowering it in the hope of having it be accepted, and the Kuomintang does not want these things. The U.S. is living up to the Taiwan Relations Act. In fact I think that is the best step we have ever made since President Carter made that declaration in 1978. But the KMT party is rejecting it.
A: Baum: Just a quick addendum to that. Obviously the Taiwanese would like to have their cake and eat it too. They would like the American defense commitment and also not to have to put up the money to modernize their own defenses. Thus far we have not really forced them to make a choice in terms of a hard decision to purchase a $15 Billion arms package.
Secondly, I think the Koumintang's opposition is not so much based on any kind of political calculus of popularity, but a question about the appropriateness of the weapons package itself. Pack 3 missiles and submarines and the submarines are very expensive are part of that package that was offered in 2001. And they are very controversial, even in Washington, whether we should be offering these weapons. So it is just not political obstruction on the part of the Koumintang, there are some real questions about the suitability of the arms package.
A: Rosen: Chen Shui-bian is pushing very hard for the arms package constantly, but it shows the limits and weakness of his power. And it is not a particularly popular issue in Taiwan in terms of public opinion. Secondly, the argument is that the weapons are out of date and if the mainland has any intentions of using any kind of military force or coercion against Taiwan, these weapon systems will not really deter them. So it would be a lot of money spent but not really work.
But what it will do, and this is the main argument, is to convince the United States to come to Taiwan's aid if the mainland then goes ahead and does something--by showing that they are concerned for their own defense. So really it is a psychological issue. They have to convince the United States that we in Taiwan are concerned, we are just not relying on you, we're going to pay for it to show just how important this is. But the weapons themselves I think are secondary. It's a psychological issue.
A: Kaufman: Well, you are right about that. You can't really understand this debate without understanding that the larger purpose here isn't deterrability but that political issue. Because ultimately Taiwan's security is going to depend if you think that there is a deterrence problem on the credibility of the America's response rather than on the particulars of these weapons systems.
Moderator: Bruce did you want to add something?
A: Herschensohn: Yes, I think that we should offer the more modern defense systems. I don't think that they would purchase them at this time—having a rough enough time on a lesser cost defense package, no matter what they may think of it. And it really is the Koumintang that is stopping it, there is no question about that, since they are not letting it come out of committee.
Q: With the Beijing Olympics coming up, do you think Taiwan will push the envelope toward independence while China is busy with the Olympics? Will the Taiwan government act during this time? And if so, what will they do?
A: Herschensohn: Just remember that when Taiwan participates in the Olympic Games they have to go under the name of Taipei China which is a great humiliation because they are not part of China and are not Chinese.
Secondly, I remember prior to the Olympic Games being held in Moscow it was thought by top U.S. policy-makers including President Carter, that aggression of the Soviet Union would decline or at least be contained because the Soviet Union was scheduled to host the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. Less than seven months before the Olympic Games began, to the surprise of U.S. policymakers, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.
We can never count on tyrannies using our logic to determine their actions.
Q: What about the build up in military spending and military strength by the Chinese communist regime?
A: Baum: It would be strange indeed if China did not try to modernize its military. What country hasn't done that? Maybe Japan might be the only modern exception to that rule. But the Japanese are soon going to reverse that. I think China's military development is quite normal. I don't think a 10 to 12% increase in the military budget is that significant a change in normal behavior.
Q: Do you think we would look at China in a more positive way if they reduced the number of missiles pointed at Taiwan?
A: Baum: The missiles are another question. The missiles certainly are intended to intimidate. That was their purpose in the beginning, to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence. That's still their purpose.
Moderator: Bob Kaufman.
A: Kaufman: I don't think it's normal. The Chinese regime's position on American presence in East Asia has shifted from the final phase of the cold war when they considered our presence positive to a position now where the Chinese seem to drive the United States out. And the Chinese are also trying, but I don't believe they are close to achieving it, trying to develop capabilities such as a blue-water navy that is striving ultimately to achieve hegemony in East Asia inimicable to American interests.
Let me make a distinction, however, in this evolutionary argument. Bruce is absolutely right to say that the policy of engagement and the record of business people in foreign policy are dismal and détente was a failure. And unfortunately Bruce, that was a Nixon-Kissinger conception. But there is a more plausible case in China that is not unassailable with the benign effects of engagements. And what it is, the Soviet Union had no private sector. So when you were trading with the Soviet Union, you were essentially subsidizing your enemy to build more missiles.
There is a plausible case to be made that along with robust deterrence in a democratic alliance system, selective engagement that strengthens market forces in China will over time create the class of Chinese that will demand political reform.
The success of that strategy however is contingent on maintaining a robust enough deterrence so that in the meantime this Leninist dictatorship doesn't try to buy out of its historical demise by geopolitical expansion. So there is a case to be made for engagement but not separate from the underlying robustness of deterrence in democratic alliances.
Moderator: Professor Rosen.
A: Rosen: Yes, thanks, a couple of things in response to some of what's been said. First, I agree with Rick [Richard Baum] in the sense that military modernization and evolution of policy are not mutually exclusive events, they can both be happening at the same time; and not necessarily be that closely related—China is a big place and a lot of things are going on. Also, Rick's argument that the kind of evolution he's talking about, if I understand it correctly, is happening in some ways in spite of what the current leadership wants to do--it's not something they're pursuing but it is the generation after them that will be actually carrying it out. So it is not a conscious decision to have this more democratization if you like, and more of a civil society being developed, but it is inevitable given the kinds of changes taking place.
Let me talk about American business and their role there. As I emphasized earlier, it is short term or long term. If you look at short term results you can certainly make an argument, maybe a persuasive argument, that rather than American business changing China, China is changing American business. So you have people like Yahoo and Microsoft going in and changing their [own] systems. Some of these companies like Google that have "Never Do Evil" as part of their motto are doing a lot of evil in China.
They're being changed because of the China market. So short term, Bruce may be right about that. But the argument is always the long term argument. In the long term whatever the current Chinese regime, this older generation, whatever they may want to do, they are not going to be able to do it—to stem that tide of progress.
The Nature of the Chinese Communist Party – Corruption and local mafias
One last point, there was a big debate years ago in China about neo-authoritarianism, it was a hot topic. And people looked at what had happened in places like Taiwan and South Korea, in places where they actually had an authoritarian system and which democratized. And they said China could follow that same model. At that time the leader was Zhao Ziyang until 1989, and they looked at him as a neo-authoritarian that could break through the bureaucratic obstacles and democratize China.
But the argument against that argument was, what is the difference between China and these other places? The big difference is China has the communist party.
Whereas in a place like Taiwan, there was a clear separation, although not completely, between economics and politics. So, although the KMT controlled politics they allowed the Taiwanese to make a lot of money and to be independent. And business did very well. There was a free market in Taiwan.
But in China everything was fused. There is so much corruption where the local business community is so dependent on the local political leaders. You have local mafias controlling all the local areas now. This is why you have all this land seizure. And the central government, because their main concern is social stability, is not willing to do anything about it. They talk a lot about it, but they are not enforcing very much. They'll make a couple of cases; kill the chicken to scare the monkey. But basically they are not doing very much about it.
China does not fit these other models because of the nature of the Chinese communist party.
Q: If Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT wins the presidential election [in 2008], what would be the result?
Moderator: Great question, I would like each of panelists to respond. And this response to this question will be your final statement and then we will draw the conference to a conclusion. So we will go back and start with the letter 'B'.
A: Baum: I think Beijing will be delighted if Ma Ying-jeou wins the election. I think they will go out of their way to make his life relatively easy, because for them reunification, which is the ultimate goal is not as important at least in the contemporary time frame as maintaining a non-independent Taiwan. That is their primary goal—to prevent a formal declaration of independence. They can worry about reunification later--that is part of kicking the can down the road. So as long as Ma Ying-jeou does not threaten a declaration of independence, I think Beijing will be delighted to let things ride as they are and might even offer some carrots in the form of reducing their pre-conditions for the three links and some other cooperative ventures.
A: Herschensohn: I am positive that the People's Republic of China would be delighted if Chairman Ma becomes president. I do believe that it will become a 'one country-two systems' [similar to Hong Kong] under Chairman Ma, and I do also agree with the fact that as long they would be comfortable having someone who is anti-independence, they would just be delighted to have him.
I believe it would be the worst possible fate for Taiwan to have Chairman Ma become president.
A: Kaufman: To be sure, I agree with Bruce entirely on his analysis and his assessment.
A: Rosen: I agree in part with everything that was said, in the sense, in part, that there is no question that Chairman Ma is Beijing's best hope. Beijing knows that if they screw things up with Ma they have no hope at all in Taiwan with anybody else. So they will do everything possible as Rick [Richard Baum] says give them the carrots and so on. We have a couple of years to go and the DPP is going to pull out some interesting strategies and moves and that will affect what Washington does, what Beijing does, what Ma does.
We don't know what the issues will be yet in the 2008 campaign and we do not know what the results will be. Let's say it is a very strong campaign where Ma may talk about better relations with China and even a peace treaty let's say. And let's say the opposition, Chen Shui-bian, has something more toward independence. And let's say one side wins fairly decisively, then I think that will have a lot to say what Beijing will do and what will end up being the consequences. But we do not know the answers to these questions.
I do not think Ma is the worst possible solution for Taiwan. I think in some ways he may be the best solution for Taiwan.
Moderator [Michael Warder, Vice Chancellor]: On that note we will end the panel discussion and the forum. I would like to express our appreciation to Dr. Wu-lien Wei and the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office of Los Angeles for helping us make this conference possible. We hope in some way we can continue this discussion into the future. Thank you all very much for coming (applause).
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