The Taiwan Policy Challenge and Status Quo Conundrun (Part III)

LOS ANGELES - Pepperdine University's School of Public Policy hosted a forum March 8th on The Worth of US-Taiwan Relations at their Malibu campus.

Some important issues regarding US-Taiwan relations were addressed at the forum including the validity of current U.S. policy regarding Taiwan and cross-strait relations between the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (Taiwan). theepoch The flowering of democracy on the island of Taiwan under the shadow of the Chinese communist regime across the Taiwan strait is one of the great success stories in international geopolitics. But a complete success in terms of full independence has yet to be realized by the Taiwanese people.

The Chinese communist regime continues to make strong claims to sovereignty over Taiwan, using military intimidation and its anti-secession law enacted last year. As the econfouomic and military influence of the PRC grows it calls into question the commitment of the United States to Taiwan.

Last week in Part II of this report we presented some main points made by Professors Bruce Herschensohn and Robert Kaufman of Pepperdine.

We now continue with comments made by Professor Stanley Rosen of USC. Following Rosen is Bruce Herschensohn and then a question and answer session.

Professor Stanley Rosen, USC:

Stanley Rosen is the Director of the East Asian Studies Center and Professor of Political Science at USC; author or editor of a variety of books on China, including State and Society in 21st-Century China (co-edited, 2004), Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (1982); Editor of the journal, Chinese Education and Society; He received his Ph. D. from UCLA.

PROFESSOR STANLEY ROSEN, USC: "Taiwan has become somehow subordinate to the U.S.–China relationship. We don't see Taiwan quite that important as Bruce and Robert do. If you look at a lot of what the analysts are writing about we see maritime Southeast Asia being more important as far as geopolitical interests are concerned". (University of Southern California)

"To a greater or lesser extent the argument of what to do with Taiwan as far as the United States is concerned is very much contingent on how the analyst, the politician, and professor making the argument sees the long term U.S. relationship with China. Taiwan has become somehow subordinate to the U.S. – China relationship. We don't see Taiwan quite that important as Bruce and Robert do. If you look at a lot of what the analysts are writing about we see maritime Southeast Asia being more important as far as geopolitical interests are concerned".

Citing Kenneth Lieberthal as an expert analyst regarding final status considerations, Rosen said, "The core of what needs to be done would consist of credible commitments to take the issues of independence and the use of force off the table. Any agreement would have to acknowledge in one form or another that this obsession that everyone seems to have with final status issues i.e., for Beijing, reunification ; and for Taiwan and Chen Shui-bian, independence . These final status issues make the situation dangerous.

"So if some agreed framework could be established that could lock in the status quo for 20 to 30 years he [Lieberthal] feels that there is every reason to believe that things would have changed significantly and a fruitful final status situation will work out and probably in China's favor". Rosen also added that analysts disagree on whether the real danger of any potential conflict will occur in the short term or long term."

"In Taiwan, the obstacles to negotiation include the government's position that Taiwan is already an independent country and the growing sense of a Taiwanese national identity. So a clear definition of what declaring independence means should be negotiated. This would then make it possible to determine if and when any future act crosses that red line of independence".

In China the main obstacle for meaningful discussion is Beijing's position that Taiwan must accept the One-China principle before any negotiations even begin. But according to Lieberthal and others this One-China principle is always raised in the context of final status issues, i.e., reunification or independence issues."

"If an agreement can be reached to assure stability for a defined period of time and that agreement includes Taiwan's commitment not to declare independence for the entire term, the One-China principle will not be violated by the outcome of the negotiations and that might satisfy China."

"Now is the U.S. capable of trying to enforce this kind of stability framework? The way to enforce it is by credibly threatening either side with deterioration in their relationship with the United States if they refuse to move in this way to reduce this potential miscalculation and future military conflict."

Next, in response to a request by the panel moderator, Herschensohn presented his point of view of former President Richard Nixon's opinion of President Jimmy Carter's decision in 1978 to no longer recognize a Republic of China on Taiwan but to recognize the People's Republic of China on the continent of China.

Herschensohn Reveals a Letter from President Nixon to President Carter:

"President Nixon had the ability I believe to believe in the tradition of a former president. He will either say nothing or he will commend the current president. He upheld that tradition. Anyone would think that he was for Jimmy Carter's changing of diplomatic relations. It isn't true. And I have absolute proof."

PROFESSOR BRUCE HERSCHENSOHN": "The letter that president Nixon wrote to President Carter was angry, about as angry as anything I have seen in print that the president has done, although it was courteous and particularly honorable, considering that Carter was then President of the United States. Publicly he made different comments". (Pepperdine University)

"That speech that President Carter gave was on December 15, he never told president Nixon that he was going to do it. He then sent a briefing to him after December 15 and on December 20, President Nixon wrote a long letter, an angry letter. It was very courteous and very respectful of the position. And at the end of it he said this is not for the public or for the press, I am not doing this to put anything on the record, this is between you and me. Boy was he angry about it; he did not want diplomatic relations given to the People's Republic of China."

"When President Nixon went to China in 1972 to establish diplomatic relations, Premier Chou En-lai, who was with Mao Tse-tung the Chairman, said that there were three stipulations: first, you would have to break and remove diplomatic relations with Taiwan; second, you would have to take your troops out; and third, you would have to abrogate the mutual defense treaty you had with Taiwan since 1954."

"President Nixon said NO, the second it was offered. Gerald Ford went to China in 1975 and he was given the same three requisites. Ford said No. President Carter was given the same offer and he said yes."

"The letter that president Nixon wrote to President Carter was angry, about as angry as anything I have seen in print that the president has done, although it was courteous and particularly honorable, considering that Carter was then President of the United States. Publicly he made different comments."

"I have held onto that letter since he wrote it on December 20, waiting for the statute of limitations to run out after 25 years. After this time I read the letter publicly at Pepperdine and I felt very good about being able to do it. I had obeyed everything. I did not say it publicly for 25 years. I am putting that letter incidentally in a book I am writing on Taiwan. But it is beyond a shadow of a doubt that President Nixon was furious about what was done by Carter."

The panel moderator asked Richard Baum for comments about what was said so far:

Baum: "Calling the current U.S. policy toward China absurd, I think, overreacts substantially to the reality of the situation, that is complicated and has serious problems in it but which I would argue in its very indeterminacy is providing vital support for the continued stability of the military situation in the Taiwan straits."

PROFESSOR RICHARD BAUM: "And this goes right to a third point that Bruce made about U.S. businesses being a great threat to the future of Taiwan because of their investment and trade with China. I think that investment and that trade are helping to accelerate evolutionary changes in China." (University of California, Los Angeles)

"I believe it is the very ambiguity and varied ability of American soldiers to move from one side and then to the other is the best guarantor of peaceful relations in the Taiwan straits. Now why is that so important if China is indeed this threatening totalitarian monstrosity that the stronger it gets, the more threatening it gets. I think that evolutionary forces are at work in China."

"And this goes right to a third point that Bruce made about U.S. businesses being a great threat to the future of Taiwan because of their investment and trade with China. I think that investment and that trade are helping to accelerate evolutionary changes in China."

"We better hope that those changes continue and indeed keep accelerating. Because that is the best guarantor that the John Mearsheimer scenario will not take place and that a confrontation of two super powers determined to exercise hegemonic force will not occur."

"In that sense, I think, and it is not satisfying if you are a principled theorist of international relations, totally unsatisfying, we should kick the can down the road as far as we possibly can and let evolutionary forces do the heavy lifting of reconciling the two different entities on either side of the Taiwan straits."

"In essence, the status quo is for me the very best of all possible worlds."

Panelist Rosen asked Kauman to comment on the current U.S. Policy:

(The core responses are given below)

PROFESSOR ROBERT KAUFMAN: "I think the overall policy has not waivered. The Bush administration is committed to a democratic, prosperous Taiwan as part of an overall Bush doctrine that believes rightly, as Natan Sharansky puts it, that you're better with a democracy, even one that hates you, and Taiwan doesn't, than a dictatorship, even one that loves you". (Pepperdine University)

Kaufman: "I think the overall policy has not waivered. The Bush administration is committed to a democratic, prosperous Taiwan as part of an overall Bush doctrine that believes rightly, as Natan Sharansky puts it, that you're better with a democracy, even one that hates you, and Taiwan doesn't, than a dictatorship, even one that loves you."

"In terms of not provoking this to its ultimate conclusion now, I think the Bush people are doing what Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill did during the second world war. Right now our primary issue is the Middle East. At the same time the Bush administration has been quite proactive under Randy Marshall, reorienting American defense strategy to give East Asia primacy, giving India-American relations a great emphasis and also bolstering our ties with Japan. So my argument is that there is a greater degree of coherence mixed with prudence in the Bush administration's policy that many people have given it credit for."

Rosen: "There is a very strong feeling among the Chinese military that American guarantees to Taiwan are not really credible when push comes to shove, partly because of all these other commitments we have. This is why I say that the Bush policy is not clear on what we would do if push did come to shove."

Kaufman: "The response to that is that success in the middle east and our overall success in demonstrating American power will have a positive spill-over deterrent effect to any Chinese regime contemplating the use of force, directly or indirectly, against the democratic Taiwan. I understand that there is division within the administration."

Rosen then directed a question to Richard Baum:

Rosen: "The envelope is being pushed more and more by Chen Shui-bian and the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) pushing for Independence. So the dangers in the short term are what Lieberthal is concerned about. And you [Baum] apparently do not think it is that important?"

Baum: "First I think the Chinese have learned from the counter productive nature of their past threats and confrontational behavior that it is better to go soft than to go hard in responding to what they perceive as Taiwanese provocation. There is learning behavior there. So I think the immediate threat of disruption is reduced thereby."

Secondly, I think Taiwanese public opinion has become stabilized around the notion that the status quo is preferable so that when Chen Shui-bian is perceived as moving too far in the direction of provoking Taiwan, public opinion tends to move back in the other direction and I think in that respect, Kuomintang (KMT) leader Ma Ying-jeou has capitalized on that. In both of those respects, public opinion in Taiwan is important and elite opinion in mainland China which is important are both tending toward calmer, more detached views of the politics of cross-strait relations."

In Part IV we will continue with comments made regarding the opinions of the Taiwanese people.