In June of 2002, a well known British magazine published a cover article "Who is Hu," showing the world's attention to this new leader of the Chinese Communist Party. Emerging from "the youngest politburo standing committee member" in 1992's 14th Congress of the CCP into today's highest CCP leader in the Party, government, and the military, Hu Jintao remains a mystery to the world. Before Hu's visit to the United States, New Tang Dynasty TV reporters in its "Insight into China" program interviewed Mr. Xin Haonian about his views on Hu's visit and Sino-U.S. relations.
Lin Dan: The CCP's president Hu Jintao had planned to visit the U.S. in September of 2005, but it had to be cancelled because of Hurricane Katrina. The nature of Hu's visit remains a question of debate till this day. A few days ago, the spokesperson of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Hu Jintao would make a formal state-level visit to the U.S. during April 18-22, 2006. This would be the first time Hu will visit the White House as a Chinese President. But the nature of Hu's visit is not agreed upon by the two sides. The Chinese side emphasizes that it is a "state visit," while the White House spokesperson Scott McClellan described it as "a visit by President Hu" at a press conference on March 22. We have to wait and see what kind of reception Hu Jintao will receive for his visit.
The reception protocol will betray whether it is a state visit or not. The protocol of a state visit includes red carpet on the lawn south of the White House, the firing of 21 cannons, a military parade, a White House meeting and an evening reception. According to international convention, only a country's president can conduct a state visit.
What reasons have caused the debate between China and the U.S. about the nature of Hu's visit? Why does not the U.S. willingly give Hu's visit the name of "state visit"? In today's "Insight into China" program, we will reflect on changes in China's national and international policies as well as changes in Sino-US relations. We believe that the audience can make their own conclusions after watching our show.
Narrator: At a meeting of the 14th CCP Central Committee in 1992, Hu Jintao, a fourth generation Chinese leader, entered the CCP's politburo's standing committee. In 2002, Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin to become the CCP's General Secretary. In March of 2003, Hu Jintao was pointed the President of the China at the 10th National Congress. In September of 2004, Hu replaced Jiang Zemin as a president of the CCP's Central Military Committee. As a successor appointed by Deng Xioaping, Hu Jintao finally abandoned the shadow of Jiang Zemin and became the highest power-holder in the Party, government, and the military in China.
Lin Dan: Hu Jintao has been on his current post for more than two years. During this time, what policies has he adopted that are different from those of his predecessor?
Xin Haonian: To understand the difference between Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, we have to first look at the different backgrounds against which the two came to power. As a brief review, Jiang Zemin took power in 1989 in the wake of the so-called "student unrest." He was faced with an unstable political situation in China as well as international pressure. Under the dual pressure, Jiang did one thing faithfully, that is, using corruption to rule China—just like Emperor Dowager of the late Qing Dynasty—and guiding the whole society to look toward money. He used this approach to make sure people cared neither about politics and changes in the society, nor about people's desires and demands. Internationally, he made sure to have a good relationship with all sides, using China's state power to purchase international communities' liking. Therefore, he left with Hu Jintao a corrupt state.
This corrupt state suffered from two outstanding problems. One, Jiang Zemin's Party was moving toward a situation of total corruption and complete decay; two, the CCP's corruption led to people's strong discontent. The conflict between the Party and the people became intensified, and resistance movement became more and more widespread. While in Jiang Zemin's hand the regime remained "stable" for 15 years, when Jiang handed over the power to Hu, the regime was moving to a historical period of instability.
Under intensified social conflicts, Hu Jintao faced a China that was different from Jiang's. If Jiang was able to keep the regime temporarily from collapsing, when Hu took power, the regime was facing the crisis of life and death. In fact, Hu Jintao is already living in the shadow of a decaying country, and he will very likely become the leader of a lost regime.
After Hu Jintao came to power, in the arena of ideological control, he implemented a policy of "tightening up internally while loosening up externally," as the Communist Party puts it. He gave the outside world an image of someone who is concerned about the ordinary people; but in internal affairs, he was even sterner than Jiang Zemin. His control of people's thoughts and the internet and his blockage of freedom of media have surpassed his predecessor. In the past two years, the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners was also increased, instead of eased or stopped with the power transfer. What is the purpose of all of this? If you ask me, it serves one purpose—that of saving the lives of the Communist Party and its regime.
Lin Dan: Other than strict control and suppression inside China, what kind of new policies has he implemented internationally?
Xin Haonian: Since Jiang Zemin used China's state power to purchase international communities' liking, like Qing Dynasty's Empress Dowager, he left Hu several good windows of opportunity, which could be used to propagate deceptive propaganda, cheating those overseas Chinese who do not know the truth, as well as deceiving the western world's leaders and politicians who do not know China. But in terms of international relation, the biggest trouble Hu faces, also one that is unresolved by Jiang Zemin nor any previous leaders, is the issue of Taiwan. So in his hand, the Taiwan issue has become more complicated and harder to resolve.
Lin Dan: But the Taiwan issue should be an internal affair; why do you consider it an international question?
Xin Haonian: You are right to point out the Taiwan issue is an internal affair. But after 1949, the issue has become internationalized as China became divided. So, although the Tainwan issue is an internal affair, it is also an international question. If Chinese people want to resolve the issue, they have to face the concern from international communities, who would "interfere" with it, even possibly using war.
We all know that the U.S. has a security treaty with Taiwan, which stipulates that the U.S. has a responsibility to protect Taiwan. Who does the U.S. protect Taiwan from? Isn't it the Chinese Communist Party? If the CCP wants to use war to resolve the Taiwan issue and unite China, would the U.S. become involved? It must, according to its security treaty with Taiwan. So it must interfere. That adds an additional factor in the question of the CCP's war against Taiwan, since it will likely bring war with the U.S. Therefore, the Taiwan question is not simply an internal affair in China; it is an affair that is already internationalized.
Lin Dan: Then what Taiwan policies did Hu issue after he took power?
Xin Haonian: First, Hu took over Jiang's threatening tactic to Taiwan, so he continued to threaten Taiwan. Jiang threatened Taiwan in the hope that it would oblige and unite with China without demanding democracy. In other words, this would make Taiwan a dictatorship like China, instead of maintaining a democratic unity. The existence of the Taiwan issue indicates that the Chinese people's nationalist desire is not fulfilled and that the CCP is not able to unify China. No matter what political trends will emerge in Taiwan, Taiwan is basically seen as one of China's provinces, one that has already implemented democratic freedom. If we see Taiwan as a province in China, from the perspective of democracy, Taiwan certainly has some positive political influence on mainland China.
China has two major issues now. One is democracy, and the other national unity. Taiwan has a positive effect on the first issue, but poses a "negative" effect on the second. Using the words of the CCP, China does not need democracy, or democracy does not fit China. But since they consider Taiwan a part of China—as a province—didn't Taiwan already have democracy? Isn't Taiwan's president elected? Hasn't Taiwan implemented a multi-party system? Isn't freedom of the press and speech already existent in Taiwan? Therefore, the positive influence of Taiwan helps raise the nation's and people's confidence in mainland China. Taiwan's existence signifies that Chinese can have democracy, China's democracy has a hopeful future, and that the democratic demand of 1.3 billion people is not wrong.
Unity with Taiwan fits with the Communist Party's dictatorship. In addition, people in mainland China also desire unity as a historical closure; unity meets people's psychological wish and feelings. We (in mainland China) see Taiwan as a hope for democracy, but Taiwan continues to waiver on the issue of unity. This is like putting salt on our wounds. The Communist Party utilizes these hurtful feelings and the people's national sentiment. It promotes a false brand of nationalism to try to bring Taiwan and overseas Chinese into unity, using this brand of nationalism to express its determination of unity to the U.S. and the western world.
Hu Jintao inherited the threatening tactics to Taiwan after taking power. Last year, during Taiwan's presidential election, People's Daily published an editorial, which said that Taiwan independence means war, and Chen Shuibian's election means Taiwan independence. This is basically saying that if Chen Shuibian is elected, Taiwan will be seeking independence and we will use war to solve the "Taiwan issue." What is the result? Chen was elected in a second term as the president. In situations like this, threat does not work for Taiwan, just like during the era of Jiang Zemin. Hu Jintao had to change the strategies about Taiwan, since if the Taiwan issue is not resolved, it may affect the CCP's survival.
Under the current circumstances, Hu Jintao and his CCP must make a determined effort to resolve the internationalized Taiwan issue. This is not to unify China, but, as I have said, to save their own lives, so that the CCP and its regime can survive this crucial moment.
Lin Dan: I remember that you have commented on the Taiwan issue before that, "The communist regime dares not to attack Taiwan before its death, it is only possible for it to attack Taiwan when it is going to die, and it will be finished when it starts the war." So right now, what stage is it in?
Xin Haonian: I hold this view for many years that the Chinese Communist regime dares not to attack Taiwan. Basically, my view has been proven right during ruling period of Jiang Zemin (former regime leader); the second stage is that it is only possible for it to attack Taiwan when it is going to die; and the third stage is that it will be finished when it begins to attack Taiwan. Now I want to point out, after Hu Jintao seized the power, it has come into the second stage of the Taiwan issue.
There are two reasons why I said it dares not to attack Taiwan in the past. Firstly, attacking Taiwan means a chance for Chinese people to overthrow the regime. In the past 20 years, the regime followed the policy "Maintaining stability is of top priority" that was set by Deng Xiaoping. It means anything that could trigger social unrest or riot should be avoided. Jiang Zemin said, "Cut the throat of any instability and social unrest during their infant stage" it actually indicates what the the thing is the regime fears the most. Instability is the thing it fears the most. If that is the case, is there anything else, besides civil war, which could cause more instability? During the process of mainland people longing for democracy, they keep waiting for a chance, a right climate. Therefore, attacking Taiwan means giving the Chinese people an opportunity and also, a perfect climate. Within the current Chinese army, already several commanders and commissars in the Command Institute of Air Force alone have been imprisoned and sentenced to death for betraying the country and turning into Taiwanese spies. Under such circumstances, if the airplane really takes off, do you know where the pilot would fly to?
In 1996, when Jiang Zemin fired blank test missiles to Taiwan, 89 youth military officers from the Qinghai Military District formed "People's Liberation Front" wanted to take the opportunity whilst the communist regime was attacking Taiwan to stage a military coup, this had become a historical fact, a warning from history. Thus, if it is unable to resolve the problem of Taiwan at one blow, if the time it takes to gain control of Taiwan through military force is prolonged, the greater the possibility of a revolution outbreak and friction within the army; the greater the possibility of an uprising staged by lower level officers within the army deeply influenced by democratic ideology. This is why the communist regime is afraid of attacking Taiwan during Jiang Zemin's era. In the early stages of Hu Jintao's leadership, the communist regime could only continue with the tactics adopted during Jiang Zemin's time, threatening Taiwan with war but in reality is afraid of doing so. However, when Hu Jintao took over, it was already the end of Jiang Zemin's rule; the regime had already reached a crucial point threatening its survival, whether to attack Taiwan or not is no longer important, death is right in front of its eyes—hence Hu Jintao's thinking has to take on a change different from Jiang Zemin's. This change is different since attacking Taiwan might be risky and under present circumstances, the regime faces the same risk even if it chooses not to attack Taiwan, then perhaps it might save itself by attacking Taiwan.
People tend to take chances, when a party or a regime reaches a stage where its survival is at stake, it will also factor in chances of success in calculating its next move. It worked out that the regime might end up in such a situation if it attacks Taiwan; however what if they succeeded in attacking Taiwan? If it won the battle it would be able to avoid the crisis, isn't that so? Hence it decides to take a chance by waging war. It builds up its military forces, increases its combat ability so that it can take over Taiwan in one blow perhaps even in a day, two days, three days, the most one week. It gains control over Taiwan even before the civilians or the low level officers in the army have the opportunity to stage a rebellion. And, if it wins the war, it also wins over so-called legitimate power, a legitimacy it never had and thus the regime is given another chance to linger on.
But this problem is not that simple. As I said before, the issue of Taiwan is an internationalized internal problem in China. It is an issue that directly affects the world's superpower—the U.S. If the communist regime finally decides to resort to military force to resolve the problem of Taiwan, what will the U.S. do? In principle, the U.S. should use military force to protect Taiwan. If she does not protect Taiwan at all, firstly she is going back on her promise; secondly, it is not to her advantage because Taiwan is a major strategic base of the U.S. in the east. It is too important as a chip in the political battle between the U.S. and mainland China hence it is very unlikely that the U.S. will not interfere in the event that China attacks Taiwan. The problem is: how will the U.S. interfere? Thus, if the communist regime attacks China and the U.S. interferes, wouldn't it inevitably lead to a war between the U.S. and China? If a military conflict arises between the two nations over Taiwan, then the communist regime would have to consider the consequences of such a battle.
Don't underestimate the leaders within the Chinese Communist Party. These people grew up amidst the bloodshed and fire from persecuting its own people and power struggle. Don't underestimate Hu Jintao's deeds in his youth. During the start of the Cultural Revolution, he led a group of Red Guards from Tsinghua University to set fire to the British embassy. Don't underestimate Hu Jintao when he was party secretary of the Tibet autonomous region. He gave orders to suppress the so called Tibetan civilian uprisings without seeking instructions from the central government and personally directed the crackdown wearing a helmet.
Whether it would turn out as what Hu Jintao hoped for, if the issue of Taiwan is resolved, if the unification of one China is realized, Hu's faltering rule is stabilized and the communist regime on the brink of collapse is able to linger on for some time, he would have to firstly think about how to handle the relationship between China and the U.S. if he intends to attack Taiwan; how to deal with the consequential conflict with the U.S. which is also the battle between U.S. and China.
Regardless of whether this would be a localized or a full-scale war, it is a risky and dreadful prospect for the communist regime. How is it going to win this war? How is it going to defeat the U.S. in the conflict with the U.S. that will be triggered during the war with Taiwan, during the process of solving its Taiwan issue? How to stop the U.S. interfere with its military action on Taiwan becomes an important question for the regime. And this issue is not only related to its plan to save its ruling in China, but also trigger the fundamental change of the relationships among the international society. The regime finally finds a solution, since attacking Taiwan could trigger the war between the U.S. and China and why it does not simply say that war is inevitable between U.S. and China. So "war is inevitable between U.S. and China" become the new strategy, a concept that Hu uses to handle the Taiwan issue after he seizes the power, a principle concept.
Narrator: On March 14, 2005, the regime passed its "Anti-Secession Law" on its Third Session of the Tenth National People's Congress. The law consists of ten articles, in article 8, it clearly defined, "to resort "non-peaceful means" to handle Taiwan independent issue. The article defines, "In the event that the 'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity."
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